Assessing the global economic outlook is a fundamentally important task of international financial institutions, governments and central banks. In this paper we focus on the consequences of the rapid growth of emerging markets for monitoring and forecasting the global outlook. Our main results are that (i) the rise of the emerging countries has sharply altered the correlation of growth rates among the main economic areas; (ii) this is clearly detectable in forecasting equations as a structural break occurring in the 1990s; (iii) hence, inferences on global developments based solely on the industrialized countries are highly unreliable; (iv) the otherwise cumbersome task of monitoring many -and less studiedcountries can be tackled by resorting to very simple bridge models (BM); (v) BM performance is in line with that of the most widely quoted predictions (WEO, Consensus) both before and during the recent crisis; and (vi) for some emerging economies, BMs would have provided even better forecasts during the recent crisis.
Introduction

1
The assessment of current and future global economic outlook is a key issue for international financial institutions, governments and central banks. Over the last twenty years, the rapid growth of the emerging countries has deeply changed the economic landscape: the world trade share of Asian most dynamic economies almost doubled, from about 13% in 1990 to 23% in 2008, 2 and their aggregate GDP now accounts for more than a quarter of world output, whereas it was less than 12% in 1990. The rise of China played a crucial role in this process, as it progressively became a new center of gravity for the other Asian economies.
During the last decade, Brazil, Russia and India also entered a path of rapid growth, and the BRIC (from the initials of Brazil, Russia, India and China) came to the fore of economic analysis as witnessed by the replacement of the G8 group of countries by the G20 as the main global economic forum. However, while reliable tools and data have long been available to analyze cyclical developments in advanced countries in a timely and comprehensive fashion, this is not true for emerging economies.
The recent literature still analyses and forecasts the global economic trends mainly focusing on either the G7 or the OECD countries (Arouba et al, 2010 , Kose et al, 2008 , Golinelli and Parigi, 2007 and Chauvet and Yu, 2006) . 3 Is this approach still sound? We do not believe so. We provide some new and original evidence on the excessive limitations of this approach and propose a viable alternative by modeling explicitly both the advanced and the main emerging economies contributions to the world economic growth.
In recent years the elasticity of world GDP growth to emerging markets' GDP growth rose to 0.4 from virtually zero. Two phenomena explain this and became apparent in the data during the nineties: an emerging Asia effect, mainly driven by the rise of China as a new center of gravity, and a globalization effect, whereby rising trade flows and stronger financial linkages proceeded almost in parallel with the expansion of new economic powers.
The first objective of this paper is to prove that these phenomena must impose a significant change in our way of monitoring and forecasting the world economy. A second objective is to present an easy, almost automatic, way of obtaining a timely assessment of global economic activity.
That something is amiss in a "business as usual" approach is shown by the dramatic failure of the traditional as well as more innovative forecasting models during the last crisis. No matter what argument one proposes to explain this failure, it has surely underscored the importance of frequent 6 forecast updates in a rapidly changing environment. 4 Updating predictions is however far from being a simple work, as it implies the maintenance and estimation of high dimension models, as well as very complex data base.
Our proposal for a monthly assessment of global perspectives is to estimate, for the main advanced and emerging countries, very simple bridge models (BM) i.e. equations where the information content of short run indicators is 'translated' into the more coherent and complete 'language' of GDP and national accounts. Our BM are based solely on industrial production in order to show the advantage of this approach without incurring in criticisms of "data mining".
GDP forecasts are obtained via BM for fifteen developed and developing countries/areas, subsequently aggregated into three main groups:
the JEU (Japan, USA, and European Union); the ASE (China, India, Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand); the BRRU (Brazil and Russia).
Finally we specify a world bridge model (WBM), where world GDP growth is the aggregation of the growth rates of these three main areas. this is to our knowledge the first attempt to "nowcast" (Banbura et al. 2010) and forecast GDP growth for advanced and emerging markets and hence, the world.
BM forecasts for the growth rates of the main countries and areas outperform those of simple benchmarks (like AR). Comparing WBM predictions with those of the annual growth rate of the world output published in the IMF-WEO provides further validation: WBM forecasts are not too far off from the results of the sophisticated forecast techniques adopted by the IMF. In particular, as the date of the WEO projection gets older the WBM quick assessment becomes a valuable way to "update" the last available WEO, or even to "anticipate" the next nearby release. For most of the countries and areas considered, the accuracy of BM forecasts appears also in line (and sometimes even more precise) with those released every month by the Consensus Forecasts.
Focusing on the most recent and dramatic recession, we show that the simple BM proposed track economic developments at least as well as other, more sophisticated model. In particular augmenting the BM with an indicator that takes into account the "confidence" effects, like the PMI, limits the undershooting of the actual GDP dynamics that becomes apparent in the case of the BM based solely on industrial production.
We have chosen to focus on the forecast of world GDP growth because it is immediately and more easily comprehensible as an indicator of global activity, compared for instance with cyclical, synthetic indicators of economic activity.
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The paper is organized as follows. In the second section we show the impact of emerging Asia on world trade and output and its consequences in forecasting world GDP. In the third section we present simple bridge models that, through the use of monthly and timely indicators, provide an easy way to frequently revise prediction of each country quarterly GDP. In the fourth section we assess the BM performance comparing it with the projections of the IMF-WEO and the Consensus Forecast; finally, we provide a closer assessment of the BM during the recent recession. Section five concludes. 7 2. The rising importance of emerging markets
2.1
Change in weights and correlation pattern among main world areas 6 In 1990, the GDP of Japan, the European Union (15) and the United States (JEU hereafter) altogether accounted for 55.8% of the world output (evaluated at purchasing power parities, PPP hereafter); by 2008, their combined share was only 46.3%. In the meantime, China's weight alone grew from 3.6 to 11.5% (see table 1). Furthermore, in the last decade, more than 60% of world output growth originated in the emerging world (in particular, China), with respect to just about 40% in the nineties (see fig. 1 ). 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8
Other Dynamic Asia Other Emerging World source: IMF WEO October 2010 6 In comparing GDP levels and growth rates, as well as in weighting trade flows and correlation patterns we focused on the period prior to the world economic crisis (i.e. prior to 2009), since this allows a clearer picture of underlying medium term trends, unhindered by the strong and uneven impact of the crisis itself. We turn to an analysis of the impact of the financial turmoil on economic performance of the main areas and its predictability in the last section of the paper.
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The rise of new global players is even more stunning when we consider trade flows: since the mid-nineties, the shares of Chinese exports have rapidly increased in all destination markets. In 2008 they accounted for 18.8, 16.5 and 13.3% of the Japanese, the US and the EU imports, respectively. At the same time, trade within the most industrialized countries shrunk as a share of the total, facing the growing importance of emerging economies. In the case of Japan, the cumulative weight of the US and the EU in its total export dropped dramatically: from 31% in 2000 to about 19 in 2008. On the contrary, intra regional trade among the East Asian countries gained importance over the last decade. At present, more than one third of Chinese trade takes place with Japan and other East Asian countries; for the latter, the weight of intra-regional trades exceed 50% of total exchanges (see Table B1 in Appendix B).
The integration of China within the international production chain crucially contributed to this phenomenon. The growth of the Chinese exporting sector has intensified the fragmentation of production processes among Asian partners, while China has become the central hub of this regional network. 7 In particular, China turned out to be a favourite location for assembling parts and components produced in other East Asian economies. Although the rising prominence of the processing trade may artificially boost the weight of intra-regional trade in East Asia, it also reveals an increasing interdependency among the economies belonging to the same production network.
Along with the rising weight of emerging areas, also the correlation pattern among world economies changed. Table 2 shows the correlations of annual GDP growth rates in the main countries and economic areas computed at three time intervals about twenty years apart. On the main diagonal there appears the average pairwise correlation within each country group, the offdiagonal figures measure the correlation among them. We focus on the G6 group of western advanced economies (i.e. the G7 without Japan), two groups of East Asian dynamic economies (Newly Industrialized Asian Economies, NIEs, and Developing Asia, excluding China), Brazil and Russia; Japan and China have been singled out from the respective reference groups, given the peculiar evolutions of their economies.
The maximum correlation between the G6 and world GDP is attained during the seventies and eighties (0.93), while it almost halved in the most recent period (0.49). Comovements between Japan and the G6 follow a similar pattern, while during the last twenty years Japan's correlation with other Asian economies rose. Similarly, comovements among growth rates of Asian economies have steadily increased over time, both within NIEs and Developing Asian economies, and between these country clusters. Looking more in details at the evolution of GDP comovements within east Asia, we observe a sharp increase of the pairwise correlations between China and most of the other Asian countries in the last twenty years, with the only exceptions of India and Philippines. The correlation of growth rates between emerging economies and the G6 remained quite low, while over the last twenty years the correlation with the world growth rose sharply for emerging Asian economies, Brazil and Russia. The fact that China growth is not correlated to that of the advanced countries, while not a prove of an absence of interdependencies suggests indirectly that considering it when forecasting world output might give additional information with respect to the behaviour of the GDP of industrialized countries.
We can tentatively conclude that: (i) the rising importance of emerging markets is clearly visible in terms of GDP and trade flows as well as in terms of contribution to overall world growth; (ii) the fast growth of emerging markets gave rise to new regional centers of gravity that have affected the linkages among world economic areas and the degree of comovement within and across the different country groups. Values greater than 0.4 in bold scripts.
2.2 "Emerging Asia" and "Globalization" effects and the assessment of the global economic outlook This evidence raises a question about the importance of emerging countries to assess the global economic outlook and to forecast world GDP growth. As a first step in addressing more formally this issue, we estimate the contributions to world GDP growth of different countries/groups. There exists an accounting relationship that links the aggregate world GDP to its components, as is clear from in figure 1. However, the extent to which each country affects world GDP growth may differ from its weight in the accounting identity, since it may play a leading role in the global economy influencing the evolution of many other countries. To investigate this point we estimate the following relationship: where u t are the errors, that should mainly contain the contribution of countries not included in the analysis; α is a constant and w i represents the elasticity of world GDP growth to aggregate i's output growth (i = JEU, ASE, BRRU).
A simple OLS estimate of equation (1) is likely affected by endogeneity for two main reasons: simultaneity/reverse causality (i.e. world growth may drive the dynamics in some areas, rather than the opposite) and omitted variables bias (i.e. output growth of countries excluded from (1) may significantly affect the evolution of those included). These endogeneity problems can be dealt with instrumental variables (IV) employing the first lag of the dependent and the explanatory variables as instruments. Estimates for the whole sample period (1979q1 -2010q1) are presented in the first column of table B2 (in the Appendix B). The choice of the IV estimator appears justified by the results of the Hausman test and the Godfrey test that does not detect significant autocorrelation in the residuals. The estimated coefficients for the whole sample highlight the relevance of JEU in explaining the world GDP evolution, while the elasticity associated with the ASE output growth is not statistically significant.
As we are mainly interested in evaluating this relationship over time, we computed the Andrews-Quandt test for the detection of breaking points in the coefficients. Figure 2 shows the behaviour of the likelihood ratio F-statistic over the time span considered . The Fstatistic progressively rises until 1994, then it fluctuates around values largely above the 1% confidence level until 2003. This clearly shows an instability "phase" during the period 1994-2003, while it is hard to commit to a specific break date since a maximum in the statistic can be due to the presence of a random spike (the second quarter of 2002, according to the Andrews-Quandt sup F statistic). hence a stable cointegrating relationship cannot be found due to pervasive and significant parameters (weights) changes over the sample period, as one could expect given the evidence in Section 2.
We chose to split the sample into two subperiods: 1979q1 -1993q4 and 1994q1 -2010q1, consistently with the evidence provided by the F-statistic. IV estimation results for the two periods are reported in column 2 and 3 of table B2 in Appendix B. The elasticity of world GDP growth to that of the ASE group sharply increases from about zero in the first part of the sample to a statistically significant 0.4 in the second, while, not surprisingly, the coefficient associated to JEU reduces from 0.8 to 0.5. The relationship between world and BRRU GDP growth rates is more stable (with an elasticity around .065 in both periods). As shown in column 4, the difference of the estimated coefficients between the two periods is statistically significant both for the JEU and the ASE groups, providing further evidence in favour of our partition of the sample. This suggests that the relevant factor in the recent evolution of world output has been the robust growth of East Asian economies ("emerging Asia effect").
The changes in the interdependencies among growth rates can be further analysed by making use of a VAR(1) model for ∆y t JEU , ∆y t ASE and ∆y t BRRU , which provides a parsimonious datacongruent representation of the dynamic relationships among the GDP growth of the three groups of countries: The estimates have been computed over the whole sample and over the two subperiods, previously identified. Table B3 presents the p-values for non-Granger causality tests (NGC), and the correlation coefficients between VAR shocks. In the first subperiod, NGC never rejects the null of no explanatory power of the past values of each aggregate's growth to the others, while in the second subperiod emerges a significant role of the ASE growth in explaining the future dynamics of both JEU and BRRU (this last group, in turn, contributes to predict the JEU growth since the mid90s). The evidence about a relevant predictive power of the Asian emerging economies with respect to the evolution of JEU GDP is confirmed by the estimates obtained over the whole sample (column 1), although these results hide the deep changes occurred between the two subperiods. Moreover, the simultaneous correlation between JEU reduced-form shocks and both ASE and BRRU innovations rises sharply in the second part of the sample, signalling a general increase in the international integration of the economies during the last fifteen years ("globalization effect").
The changes in the propagation of shocks are summarised by the generalised impulseresponse functions (G-IRF, see Pesaran and Shin, 1998) , derived from the VAR estimates (see figure B1 in Appendix). Again, both the impact and the persistence of the effects of ASE shocks on the JEU and BRRU growth are evident only in the second subperiod. The effect of the ASE shock always tends to last about 3-4 quarters, while neither JEU nor BRRU shocks seem to play a significant effect in shaping the future path of emerging Asian economies GDP growth. Nevertheless, from the G-IRF plots also emerges the increased interdependence among the three groups.
Overall, our findings make evident that knowledge about a wealth of short run indicators for JEU countries alone is no longer enough for a good understanding of the world dynamics. 12 3. Assessing out-of-sample bridge models' ability in forecasting quarterly world GDP From this discussion we can conclude that a reliable assessment of the evolution of the global economy cannot be attained by focusing solely on developed countries, at least since the early 2000. Failure to recognize this fact, still not fully taken into account in the recent literature, might seriously bias the analysis. It is however costly to monitor a large number of economies, some of which are relatively little studied and poor in terms of data quality. Here we propose a way of dealing with this problem at a minimum cost.
In short-term forecasting there are two main family of tools commonly used: bridge models (BM), based on a small and carefully selected set of indicators, and factor models (FM), estimated on a large panel of data.
10 This paper deals essentially with the first one, that has been extensively applied in short run forecasting exercises for the Euro Area, the G7 countries, and Italian GDP; see Baffigi et al. (2004) , Golinelli and Parigi (2007; . This choice is motivated by the consideration that BM may be particularly effective in short-term forecasting in emerging economies, where only a limited number of high frequency indicators is generally available. This is confirmed by a IMF (2010) study 11 that develops indicators for tracking growth in various countries: while for advanced economies the use of a large set of variables results in accurate forecasts, results are much poorer for emerging countries.
We build simple bridge models with industrial production (IP) as the only RHS variable 12 to deliver early GDP estimates for JEU, ASE and BRRU countries. We construct a World Bridge Model (WBM) whereby World GDP is computed using an aggregator equation of these three country groupings.
13 IP has been chosen since it is reliable as a coincident indicator of GDP and it is usually subject only to small revisions. We focus solely on IP not to incur in the critique of selecting artificially good models (i.e. with best performing indicators) just because our knowledge of "future" (actually past) events creeps into the BM specification. Consequently, one can think of the WBM predictions presented in this and the next section as a lower bound of the forecasting ability of short run indicators. This is confirmed by comparing -over the common sample 2000q1-2003q4 -the forecasting performance of our raw BMs with that of the carefully specified BMs for the advanced countries reported in Golinelli and Parigi (2007) . The superiority of the latter BMs in forecasting GDP is manifest: considering the estimates of current GDP growth (the so called nowcast case) carefully chosen indicators reduce the root mean square errors from 0.69 to 0.31 for Japan, from 0.20 to 0.14 for the European Union and from 0.57 to 0.25 for the US.
We define a simple BM for country i, as a fourth order autoregressive distributed lags model -ARDL(4,4) -in error-correction form for the log-levels of GDP and IP: 14 10 For a comparison and a discussion of BM and DF approaches see Bulligan et al. (2010) . 11 See Appendix 1.2 of Chapter 1 in IMF, WEO October 2010. 12 Apart from lagged values of the dependent variables. 13 Examples of aggregator equations can be found in Baffigi et al., 2004, and Parigi, 2007. 14 Four more parsimonious models, nested in (3), can be obtained by imposing parameter restrictions: (3-i) the ARDL(3,3) in log-levels: ; (3-ii) the ARDL(2,2) in log-levels: ; (3-iii) the ARDL(1,1) in differences (i.e. which omits all log-levels): ; and (3-iv) the static model in differences ARDL(0,0): . We select the best model out of these five alternatives by minimizing the Schwarz criterion, because of our preference for parsimony in forecasting with potentially mis-specified models. Alternative criteria, more prone to (over)fitting, such as Akaike or R 2 -bar, would lead to noisier forecasts.
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All BMs are conditioned on simultaneous IP (through the i 0 β parameter), which is available well before the GDP data of the corresponding quarter. However, when forecasting the current quarter, usually not all three months are known and, in any case, IP observations cannot be available for further horizons. In these circumstances, missing IP data are forecast by auxiliary models. We consider four alternative scenarios corresponding to different situations of data availability in typical forecasting practices: when forecasting GDP one quarter ahead (i.e. in the current quarter), the conditioning IP may be known just for the first month of the quarter, or for the first two, or, finally, for all three months (this is the so called nowcast). In the first two instances, IP has to be predicted for two or one step ahead prior to forecasting GDP. More generally, in the hquarter ahead GDP forecast, when h > 1, IP forecasts are needed at least for (h-1) × 3 months and in the worst case for (h-1) × 3 + 2 months of the forecast horizon.
In all scenarios but the nowcast, auxiliary models are needed, and their reliability in predicting the IP clearly influences the forecasting ability of BMs. In this paper, we use only one auxiliary model: a simple AR(p) for monthly IP log-differences. 15 For each country, the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of both models (AR for IP and BM for GDP) have been obtained through rolling regressions.
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The pseudo out of sample forecasting exercise covers 10 years and is structured as follows. October 1999 is the month in which we start to simulate the behavior of a forecaster who wants to predict world GDP ("first round"): IP is available up to August 1999 (1999m8, two months before the calendar date) and GDP up to the second quarter of 1999 (1999q2). In order to obtain predictions over the following two years (2000) (2001) , IP has to be forecast up to 28 months ahead and BM up to 10 quarters ahead. In this first round, the BM estimation period ends in 1999q2 and starts 80 quarters earlier for JEU countries, 60 quarters for the others groups of countries. These steps are repeated for the next 119 months, the latter round being September 2010, when IP is known up to 2010m7 and forecast up to 2011m12 (i.e. 16 months ahead) and GDP is known up to 2010q2 and forecast up to 2011q4 (6 quarters ahead).
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Though BM are normally used only for short run predictions, nonetheless in each forecast round we extrapolate GDP dynamics up to two years, in order to give an extended assessment of the forecasting ability of our approach at longer horizons.
18 Overall, our exercise delivers 40 pseudo out of sample forecast errors for each of the first three 1-step ahead scenarios described above (120 forecasts errors). In addition, we measure forecast errors for 2-, 4-and 6-steps ahead. We compute statistics about BM forecasting ability (mean error, ME, and root mean squared error, RMSE), and compare them with benchmark models (AR quarterly model for world, JEU, ASE and BRRU GDP growth rates) using Fair and Shiller (1990) , and Giacomini and White (2006) tests (FS and GW henceforth) . AR benchmark models are estimated through rolling windows and used in predictions over the same spans of data as those of the BMs.
14 Along the rows of table 3, we report the results for JEU, ASE and BRRU and world GDP. Along the columns six different forecast horizons are evaluated: the first three are those described in 1-step ahead scenarios from # 1 to # 3, the following three report the results at longer horizons. Errors are computed as "forecast -actual".
Results show that in the short run, BM forecasts are usually unbiased (see the ME results), and significantly outperform the benchmark. This conclusion is valid for world GDP and across country groups, but is starker for JEU, that have normally lower RMSE than ASE and BRRU. Ratios of BM RMSE over that of AR benchmarks are almost always below one over horizons up to six months, showing a clear deterioration only at the end of the forecasting horizon (six quarters). BM RMSE are not only better "numerically" than those of AR benchmarks, but -in the light of the GW test -they are very often significantly better than benchmark ones. Furthermore, according to the FS test, BM forecasts are significant explanations of actual GDP development, at least up to one-year, while the significance of benchmark models is often spurious, possibly a consequence of the sharp fall in GDP in 2008-9. For this reason, "b" cases in table 3 (where both the BM and AR parameters are significant in the FS regression) tend to be more frequent in JEU countries, where the recession was particularly severe.
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A direct way to assess the important contribution of emerging countries forecast to the prediction of the global outlook is obtained by comparing the WBM predictions of the world output 15 growth either including or excluding the groups of ASE and BRRU in the aggregator equation. In figure 3 we show the ratios between the RMSE obtained from the more comprehensive model (numerator) and from the model excluding the emerging countries (denominator). RMSE ratios for the different forecasting horizons are computed over two sample periods (2000-2003, histograms in grey, and 2004-2010 in black) , to evaluate whether the relevance of emerging markets has increased in most recent years.
All the ratios are lower than one, meaning that the aggregator model which includes also the ASE and BRRU countries provides more accurate predictions for the world GDP growth. The gain in precision is greater for short term forecasts, attaining the maximum in the nowcast case, while it tends to disappear at longer horizons. The RMSE ratios computed over the second part of the sample (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) are generally lower than those of the first period (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) . The limited number of observations prevents us from computing tests for the significance of these differences. However, these results confirm the evidence presented so far about the importance of the information content of emerging country dynamics. 
(1) Bars represents the ratios of the RMSE incurred when predicting world GDP with a bridge model that includes emerging economies (ASE and BRRU) and the RMSE computed when the bridge model includes only advanced economies (JEU). Values below 1 prove that the more comprehensive model outperforms the latter. The comparison between grey and black bars, whenever black bars are shorter shows the rising importance of emerging economies. (2) Results refer to the case in which the conditioning IP is known for all three months of the quarter (nowcast).
The WBM, Consensus and the IMF's WEO forecasts of world GDP
A more stringent test of the usefulness of our simple BM is given by comparing their predictions with those based on much richer information sets, such as the forecasts published by IMF in April and October of each year in the World Economic Outlook (WEO), or those published monthly by Consensus Forecast. We must stress that our simple WBM is not designed to predict GDP at the horizons typical of the IMF's WEO and Consensus Forecast, nor it can compare with them in terms of model complexity and completeness of the information set. Nonetheless, BMs can be seen as a quick update of the bi-annual WEO's forecasts or as a tool to gauge the changes in the Consensus monthly predictions.
Forecast comparison with the WEO
Once we are equipped with our WBM 21 , we might wonder whether, after the publication of the WEO, there is some use for the WBM as we wait for the next WEO release. More specifically, we perform two exercises: a) an "updating exercise" to assess whether the WBM provides better predictions than what is currently available; b) an "anticipating exercise" to assess the reliability of the WBM in anticipating the predictions that will be published in the next-nearby WEO.
In the updating exercise, from October of year t to March of t+1 the WBM "updates" 6 times the world output growth forecasts for years t+1 and t+2 already published in October of year t; similarly, from April to September of year t+1 it updates 6 times the forecasts published in April t+1 (see Tab. B5).
22 Similarly, the anticipating exercise is structured as follows: from October of year t to March of t+1 our WBM can "anticipate" 6 times the world output growth forecasts for years t+1 and t+2 that will be published in April of year t+1; similarly, from April to September t+1 we anticipate 6 times the forecasts that will be published in October t+1. TARGET YEAR "t + 2"
TARGET YEAR " t + 1"
1.53
Month of forecast for WBM
Month of WEO release used for comparison
In the updating exercise reported in table 4a, the WBM 1-year ahead predictions (termed t+1) appear to be more accurate with respect to the October WEO release already in December of year t and through the first months of year t+1. On the other hand, the predictions of the April WEO, are 21 Obviously, what is said here for the WBM can be replicated for the single BMs of countries and country groups.
22 Hence from October t to March t+1 we "anticipate" 6 times the world output growth forecasts that will be published in April for years t+1 and t+2; similarly, from April to September of year t+1 we "update" 6 times these forecasts and compare them with those published in October t+1. It is worth recalling that April WEO forecasts are based on data available up to March, while October WEO forecasts on data up to September. outperformed only by the WBM in September of the same year, when sufficient new high frequency information (here IP) dramatically improves WBM accuracy. In the last 3 months of the year (not reported in the table) the WBM accuracy is always significantly superior to the October WEO release as to the prediction of "current" year growth. In the anticipating exercise, shown in table 4b, the accuracy of the WEO can be compared to two benchmarks: the final estimates of the annual growth (third column in each "target year" section of table 4b), or the next-nearby WEO forecast (first column). Results lend support to the conclusion that the accuracy of WBM forecasts increases as we approach the date of the WEO release, by exploiting more and more monthly information. Table 5 focuses on what we termed "1-year ahead" prediction, i.e. WBM forecasts for year t+1 produced in the last 3 months of the previous year and in the months from January till September of the year to be forecast. Monthly WBM forecast errors with respect to the "final" GDP are compared with the WEO ones. In particular, we made the same two different types of check termed above updating and anticipating the WEO.
In other terms, we compare with a statistical test what is descriptively reported in table 4a and 4b. In both cases, we assess the relative performance of the predictions using a simple forecast encompassing test (see Clements, 2005) , which is quite close to that proposed in Fair and Shiller (1990) , + is the forecast combination error, to be minimized as a function of the estimated parameter (weight) λ. The hypothesis that WBM forecast encompasses the WEO ones can be tested imposing λ = 0 in eq. 4.
If the WBM forecast error is defined -as above -for m = October to December of year t and January to September of year t+1 , while the WEO one is for i = October of year t and April of year t+1, eq. (5) can be used to test for WBM ability to update next WEO, i.e. the first of the two exercises above. Alternatively, if the WBM forecast error is defined for m = October to December of year t and January to September of year t+1 and the WEO one is for i = April and October of year t+1, eq. (5) can be used to test for WBM ability to predict next-nearby WEO, as stated the second of the two exercises above.
In short, given the same WBM forecast errors in eq. (5), the subject of the two encompassing tests depends on the competing WEO errors: if we use the last published issue errors, we refer to the updating exercise, if we use next published issue errors, we refer to the anticipating one.
Though we must be cautious because of the lack of data (each regression is run over a sample of only 10 observations), the results are sufficiently clear to detect the WBM ability of efficiently exploit information, when data on GDP are not yet released, while indicators are available (see table  5 ). WBM forecasts from October of year t to February or March of year t+1 encompass WEO ones published in the issue of October of year t. WEO forecasts are no more negligible in April, when new IMF predictions are released, but WBM forecasts start encompassing again WEO ones from June to the end of the forecasting exercise. Note that there are a few exceptions to this overall pattern, that repeats itself for world growth and for JEU, ASE and BRRU's ones, notably results for ASE are less favourable for BM. Given the paucity of data points on which the p-values are computed, we cannot deny that the presence of a single outlier might hide an otherwise robust pattern. 23 See Clements and Hendry (2004) . Estimation results in Table 6 are robust to the inclusion of an intercept in the test equation in order to allow for biased forecasts. Though the inference about the λ parameter is based on the Newey and West (1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard error estimates, the reported results are robust to alternative estimates of parameters' variance-covariance matrix.
As to the anticipating test, from October of year t to March of t+1, WBM never encompasses WEO forecasts of world growth in t +1 released in April of year t+1, while at the very end of the forecast round, i.e. since September t+1, WBM forecast encompasses the next-nearby WEO (October) forecasts. A similar pattern is detectable also for the JEU and BRRU aggregates, while for ASE BM forecasts encompass the predictions that will be released in the "future" WEO since June of year t+1.
Overall, we can conclude that, in order to predict the current year, WBM forecasts are generally better than previous WEO ones, with the exception of the months immediately after the April release. If we want to anticipate the world GDP forecast published in October WEO, then only the WBM predictions made since September (when two quarters of GDP and also one month of the third quarter of IP are known) appear to be more accurate. In the anticipating exercise, BM forecasts turn out to be a particularly effective tool, in comparison with the WEO benchmark, in predicting the GDP of emerging economies, in particular for the ASE group. (1) Data taken from Consensus Forecasts various years. The comparison is made on the sample (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) World JEU ASE
Month of forecast
We extended the analysis to Consensus predictions. Each month we compared the RMSE of the BM estimates for GDP in year t+1 (along the lines seen above for the comparison with the WEO) with that of the monthly forecasts of Consensus (see Table 6 ). BM perform in line or better than Consensus in most cases (results for the "world" might be biased by the different set of countries considered by Consensus Forecasts), hence we find some comfort also here in our reliance on these simple tools to have a quick update of the conjunctural situation. What really matters here, however, is not establishing if one method is clearly superior to the other: the main advantage of the BM consists in the possibility of relating changes in the predictions to changes in the conditioning variable (in the simplest case, IP) rather than just deriving it from black box expert judgment.
It is worth observing that even though we not take into account data revisions, as it uses latest available GDP time series, this fact does not necessarily lead to an artificial improvement of our models forecasting ability. In fact, Stark (2001 and 2002) modelling US GDP growth do not find a significant difference between the forecast errors generated using real-time data or latest-available data. The same result is broadly confirmed for other industrialised countries, (see e.g. Golinelli and Parigi, 2008 , for the Italian case). 
4.2
Forecast performance during the recession: WBM, WEO and Consensus
During the recession of 2007-09 the main forecasting institutions performed particularly poorly, facing a sequence of unprecedented shocks not comparable with those included in the sample period normally used for forecasting (see Visco, 2009) . It is therefore interesting to check if the bridge models proposed here, although very simple and not tailored for predicting next year growth, could have made a reasonably good job in tracking the evolution of the world economy during the crisis. The sharp slowdown in world GDP growth occurred in 2009 proved particularly hard to anticipate, as shown in table 7. We therefore select this year for our "recession tracking" exercise. To monitor the forecasting performance of the WBM we plot in Figure 4 the monthly predictions of 2009 GDP growth computed over the January 2008 -December 2009 period. We compare BMs with the WEO, considering this time also the "updates" published between the main releases of IMF forecasts. 25 We also look at Consensus Forecasts published monthly for all the countries considered in this paper. The prediction of annual GDP growth for the world (and for JEU, ASE and BRRU, see appendix B) were obtained as a weighted sum of those of the countries involved, with weights given by 2000 GDP shares at PPP.
26
As shown in the graph (figure 4), only at the end of the summer of 2008 the models started signaling a deceleration in growth. By the end of that year it became clear that the economic slump was much harsher than previously envisaged. Quite surprisingly, our simple BMs did not perform visibly worse than Consensus or the WEO (considering the updates to the world outlook).
24 This conclusion must be qualified. Since no direct evidence is available for emerging countries -at least as far as we know -it might well be that, though unlikely given the wealth of studies on industrial economies, the conclusion could be reversed for emerging countries. 25 During this period the IMF published forecasts updates every other quarter, thus effectively providing a new scenario for the world outlook every 3 months. Since the IMF started only recently to issue Interim forecasts it was not possible to consider them when analyzing the BMs ability to update and anticipate the WEO. 26 As Consensus does not publish world output growth, we computed it as the weighted sum of the following countries:
USA, Japan, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy and Spain (for JEU), and the four single BRIC countries. Weights -constant over time -are derived from IMF (2010), World Economic Outlook, April, p. 148. Nonetheless, a disturbing feature of the WBM behaviour is the considerable undershooting in the spring of 2009, when the US (and probably the world) economy reached a trough according to the NBER business cycle dating.
27 Our BMs -being based solely on industrial production that was hit much harder than the other sectors -are bound by design to produce a starker slump. We might suspect that a richer specification of the BMs would contribute to reduce the undershooting. It is interesting to look at countries and groupings (see figure B2 in appendix B) and observe that the underprediction was strong for advanced countries (both JEU and Asian NIEs), where services play a larger role in economic growth, while it was nil in the case of China, whose growth is largely determined by manufacturing output and exports.
To verify the soundness of our presumption, we introduce a new indicator in our BMs to account for economic developments over and above industrial production. For most countries we considered a PMI or similar statistics, to exploit information coming directly from firms and not confined to production activity (see table A3 for a complete list). 28 As expected, taking into account also the indicator, reduces the undershooting of the BMs. In particular the forecast combination of the original BM (based only on IP) and of the BM based only on the new indicator gives the best results by greatly reducing the undershooting of the predictions (Fig. 5) . This is true not only for the world GDP, but also for the main countries and groupings considered here (see figure B2 in the appendix). (1) The horizontal axis measures the calendar dates in which the forecasts are made. WBM line measures the forecasts made with bridge models in rounds # 97-120 (see Appendix B).
Conclusions
Over the last fifteen years financial and economic globalization proceeded at high speed. New actors appeared on the scene of the world economy, moving rapidly to the center stage. China and the other East Asian emerging economies (together with Brazil and Russia), nowadays play a determinant role in all economic fora. The greater relevance acquired by the G20, that has de facto taken the place of the G8, is a product of this evolution and at the same time it confirms the deep changes occurred in the economic and political landscape.
The analysis of the global economic developments must not ignore these changes. This is true also for the assessment of its short run evolution. In the first part of this paper we showed that a break occurred in the relationship between world GDP and that of the main advanced countries (Japan, the EU and the US). We also showed that this break is due to the increased weight of the Asian emerging economies, characterized by a markedly different cyclical pattern (the emerging Asia effect). This implies that considering only the economic situation of the most advanced country (as in Golinelli and Parigi, 2007; and Arouba and Diebold, 2010) might give a biased picture of the main trends at global level.
Exploiting simple bridge models, we provide a natural and easy way to tackle this new environment. The models proposed have been deliberately kept very simple, in order to show the advantage of our approach without unavoidably incurring in criticisms of using ex post knowledge in the specification of the models ("data mining"). We also show how the inclusion of information on emerging markets improves the accuracy of world GDP forecasts.
A problem arises, though, when dealing with the world economy: the lack of a benchmark variable at higher frequencies (say, quarterly) with which to evaluate the reliability of the tools proposed for the assessment of the current situation. The solution given in this paper has been to compare our forecasts with those periodically published by international institutions, such as the IMF's WEO or Consensus. Bridge models estimates fare well with respect to the WEO forecasts, both as an updating (the most recent WEO forecasts) and as an anticipating (the next WEO forecasts) device. They also stand a comparison with Consensus Forecasts. Forecasting accuracy, however, is not the whole story: the value of bridge model estimates lies also in the their real time availability and in the extreme simplicity of the computations.
The comparison with broad based forecasts stressed the importance of employing a set of indicators covering most economic sectors. Our simple models consider only industrial production, which clearly provides a partial view of the evolution of the economic activity at least in advanced countries. This is the main reason for the undershooting of bridge models estimates during the crisis of 2009. Introducing, in this latter case, an extra variable that takes into account the confidence effects (PMI), gives rise to better results.
Appendix A -Data sources
We collected the longest available series of both quarterly GDP and monthly IP for: US, European Union, Japan, Brazil, Russia, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea and Taiwan.
GDP quarterly data. Il National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) provides quarterly world GDP data which are coherent with annual WEO figures. Regarding the other 15 countries/areas we used the respective sources, listed in Table A1 . In order to have comparable GDP national levels, we re-scaled all the "final" quarterly GDP time series to match the 2000 annual levels expressed in international Dollars (PPP), as they are reported by the IMF's WEO.
IP monthly data. The source of data for US, European Union, Japan, Brazil, India and Russia is the OECD Main Economic Indicators (MEI) database, the series selected is production of total industry, seasonally adjusted (2005=100). Data for this series are available at least since 1975 with only two exceptions: India, whose series starts in 1994 and Russia, whose series starts in 1993. For India data from 1960 to 1993 are constructed using the growth rates of the corresponding series published by the IMF's International Financial Statistic (seasonally adjusted with X12 ARIMA). In the case of Russia data are backcasted to 1989 using the monthly interpolation (quadratic match sum) of Bessonov (2002, Tab. 4) annual growth rates. China IP data rely on a series built by the Bank of Italy, data prior to 1989 are constructed using the growth rate of electricity consumption. Other Asian countries' IP series (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Singapore, Korea and Taiwan) we used the respective national sources, listed in Table A2 .. Monthly data for Indonesia (prior to 1994) and Philippines (prior to 1995) are backcasted using the monthly interpolation (quadratic match sum) of the available quarterly growth rates. Monthly data for Malaysia (prior to 1990) are backcasted using the monthly growth rate of the nominal sales deflated by CPI. For Hong Kong, IP data are replaced by the series (available from 1983) of cement production (volume index). 
In these case, not seasonally adjusted (nsa) data are filtered by using X12 ARIMA.
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Appendix B -Additional tables and graphs -2010 Q1 1979 Q1-1993 Q4 1994 Q1-2010 Q1 (3)−(2)
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(1) HAC standard errors are reported in brackets. -2010 Q1 1979 Q1-1993 Q4 1994 Q1-2010 Q1 Figure B1 -Impulse-response from VAR(1) estimates: response to generalized one S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E. 
